Home-The Dual-Use Dilemma: Why Europe Must Rethink Civil-Military Innovation

The Dual-Use Dilemma: Why Europe Must Rethink Civil-Military Innovation

From satellites to AI, today’s most transformative technologies don’t fit neatly into boxes marked “civilian” or “military.” In Europe, the rise of dual-use innovation is rewriting assumptions about funding, strategy, and security — and raising thorny questions about what counts as defence in an age of blurred lines.

 

What Exactly Is ‘Dual-Use’?

At its core, a dual-use technology is one that serves both civilian and military purposes. Historical examples include GPS (originally developed by the U.S. Department of Defence and now central to global transport and logistics) and the internet itself. Today, AI algorithms, biotech, and satellite systems all fall under the dual-use umbrella — simultaneously enabling commerce, governance, and defence.

Yet despite its intuitive appeal, the concept of “dual-use” has no universally accepted definition. While it’s commonly understood as referring to technologies that can be applied in both civilian and military contexts, its interpretation varies across policy domains, funding programmes, and legal systems. Some definitions focus on export controls; others include a broader spectrum of innovations that might be repurposed for defence and security. This lack of clarity poses real challenges for governance, especially within EU funding and innovation frameworks where clearer guidelines are needed. Some scholars have even suggested shifting toward terms like “omni-use” to capture the versatility and interconnectedness of modern technologies1.

Three general categories of definitions tend to appear in academic and policy debates:

  1. Teleological or value-laden definitions.

These emphasize the purposes a technology might serve — both beneficial and harmful. They focus less on the technical characteristics and more on potential outcomes. While often vague, this approach highlights the moral ambiguity and context dependence of modern innovations2.

 

  1. Functional or value-neutral definitions.

These describe dual-use technologies as those that can operate in both civilian and military settings. This definition focuses on technical applicability rather than intention or morality, and it’s commonly used in academic and policy documents2,3.

 

  1. Legal definitions.

Found in export control regimes, these are the most codified but also the narrowest. For example, EU Regulation 2021/821 defines dual-use items as “software and technology which can be used for both civil and military purposes,” including those linked to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons4.

Each of these definitions captures a different dimension of the dual-use concept — but none fully accounts for the blurred boundaries, governance dilemmas, and strategic challenges posed by today’s fast-moving innovation landscape.

 

Strategic Ambiguity: When Definitions Meet Policy

This definitional uncertainty isn’t just an academic issue — it plays out in real-world policy debates, especially where funding, accountability, and strategic priorities intersect. As governments expand their defence budgets, the temptation to reclassify civilian initiatives as “dual-use” — whether to meet alliance commitments or tap into favourable funding — has grown.

Infrastructure upgrades, digital networks, or even public health systems have at times been labelled “dual-use” with limited demonstrable military relevance. For example, certain rail and logistics projects within the EU’s Connecting Europe Facility have been categorized as dual-use due to their potential to support military mobility — even though their primary function remains civilian5.

This ambiguity is especially relevant ahead of NATO’s June 2025 summit in The Hague, where alliance leaders are expected to debate a proposed 5 % GDP defence spending goal: 3.5 % for direct military expenditures, and 1.5 % for broader security-related domains like infrastructure and cybersecurity6. While the intention is to reflect the multifaceted nature of modern security, the lack of clear criteria for what qualifies as “defence-related” spending could encourage creative accounting or politically motivated classifications. Without transparent benchmarks and shared definitions, there is a risk that this broader spending target may dilute, rather than strengthen, NATO’s strategic cohesion.

In this context, clearer guidance — on what is and what isn’t dual-use — becomes not just a semantic issue, but a strategic one. The credibility of funding tools, defence statistics, and even alliance solidarity depends on it.

The Central European Opportunity

At the Institute for Central Europe (ICE), we believe that understanding dual-use innovation is not just a technical matter — it’s a strategic imperative.

For smaller and mid-sized countries, the dual-use model offers a unique opportunity. While they may not lead in traditional defence-industrial production, many of them — including those in Central and Eastern Europe — possess dynamic tech sectors, highly skilled engineers, and nimble research institutions. These are ideal ingredients for contributing to Europe’s innovation landscape in ways that are both civilian-driven and strategically relevant.

Supporting dual-use innovation is not just smart national policy — it’s also becoming a European priority. As recent proposals by the European Commission and institutions like the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Innovation Council (EIC) show, the firewall between civilian and defence innovation is beginning to fall. On 22 April 2025, the Commission proposed rule changes that would allow the EIC to support dual-use companies and fund defence-adjacent technologies7 — a long-overdue shift that reflects global realities and responds to the urgent need for Europe to remain competitive in critical tech sectors.

This strategic reframing matters. Without access to defence-related markets, Europe’s most promising startups risk stagnation or relocation — a dynamic our competitors, especially the U.S., have long understood and capitalized on. As EIC Board Member Lars Frølund put it: “Dual-use innovation can turbocharge Europe’s competitiveness, create new markets, and strengthen our industrial base.”8

We at ICE are particularly interested in how innovation policy, funding mechanisms, and institutional partnerships can be shaped to support this evolving model. This means asking smart questions:

– How do we build innovation ecosystems that serve both security and societal goals?
– What rules and incentives are needed to foster responsible, scalable dual-use development?
– And how can smaller states meaningfully contribute to European security through innovation, not just procurement?

By tracking these trends — and participating in the broader conversation — ICE aims to support evidence-based policymaking that balances agility with accountability, and national interests with shared European goals.

 

References:

  1. Singer, J.R., Mueller, E.F., Kraus, R. (2025). Dual-Use or Omni-Use? Rethinking Technology in a Borderless World. https://ssrn.com/abstract=5185227  or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5185227
  2. Hähnel, M. (2024). Conceptualizing dual use: A multidimensional approach. Research Ethics, 21(2), 205-227. https://doi.org/10.1177/17470161241261466 (Original work published 2025)
  3. Alic, J.A., Branscomb, L.M., Brooks, H., Carter, A.B., & Epstein, G.L. (1992). Beyond Spinoff: Military and Commercial Technologies in a Changing World. Harvard Business School Press.
  4. European Union (2021). Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items. Official Journal of the EU.
  5. European Commission (2024). Connecting Europe Facility – Infrastructure and Investment. https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-themes/infrastructure-and-investment/connecting-europe-facility_en
  6. Reuters (2025). NATO’s Rutte says he assumes alliance will agree on 5% spending target. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/natos-rutte-says-he-assumes-alliance-will-agree-5-spending-target-2025-05-26/
  7. Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (2025). European Commission proposes Regulation to incentivise defence-related investments in the EU budget. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/european-commission-proposes-regulation-incentivise-defence-related-investments-eu-budget-2025-04-22_en
  8. Frølund, L. (2025). Viewpoint: Dual-use innovation, a strategic choice for Europe. Science|Business. https://sciencebusiness.net/european-innovation-council/viewpoint-dual-use-innovation-strategic-choice-europe

 

Katarína Cséfalvayová