Prvá spoločná analýza ICE a Pleronix sa venuje realistickej stratégii protivzdušnej obrany Európy

Prvým spoločným výstupom novej spolupráce medzi Institute for Central Europe (ICE) a spoločnosťou Pleronix je analýza „Affordable Sovereignty: A Realistic Air-Defense and Counter-Drone Strategy for Europe’s Small and Mid-Size Nations.“
Publikácia sa zameriava na realistické možnosti európskych krajín v oblasti protivzdušnej obrany a obrany proti dronom – a zároveň na hodnotenie hrozieb (threat assessment), ktoré sa v dnešnom rýchlo sa meniacom bezpečnostnom prostredí stáva kľúčovou súčasťou strategického rozhodovania.

Moderné konflikty ukazujú, že lacné a ľahko dostupné drony zásadne menia charakter vojenských hrozieb. Európske štáty preto potrebujú novú, realistickú stratégiu obrany, založenú na inováciách, spolupráci a efektívnom využívaní zdrojov. Drony, ešte donedávna technológia určená najmä na prieskum či priemyselné využitie, sa dnes stali zbraňovým systémom, ktorý zásadne ovplyvňuje priebeh moderných konfliktov.

 

        

 

 

Affordable Sovereignty: A Realistic Air-Defense and Counter-Drone Strategy for Europe’s Small and Mid-Size Nations

Joint Analytical Report

 

1. The Evolving Threat

The character of modern integrated national air defense has been irrevocably altered in recent years through technological revolutions in AI and hardware miniaturization. The proliferation of low-cost, precise, and autonomous Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and new aerial threats have fundamentally broken the economic model of traditional air defense. The war in Ukraine serves as a brutal, daily proof-of-concept: mass and price, not just technological sophistication, now define aerial lethality. Russia’s forces, for example, launched approximately 5,500 one-way attack (OWA) UAS against Ukraine in September 2025 alone. In response, Ukrainian forces reported hitting 66,500 enemy targets in the same month, with 39,200 of those hits attributed to kamikaze drones. Additionally, the issue of simplicity of operation, low costs and attribution challenges means that not only state actors, but also terrorist groups and small insurgent organizations now possess a strategic hostile capability which can disrupt national security.

In September and early October 2025, Europe faced a sudden and coordinated escalation: a wave of Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) incursions, widely attributed to Russia, targeted critical infrastructure across at least ten nations. These incidents exposed fundamental defense gaps and triggered an urgent political response centered on the pan-European “Drone Wall” initiative. The actions were a deliberate act of hybrid warfare designed to test NATO resolve, sow public discord, and probe vulnerabilities. Attacks included swarms of Gerbera (Shahed-style) drones entering Polish airspace, military reconnaissance drones flying over Munich Airport — forcing its closure and diverting dozens of flights — and suspected Russian fighter jets violating Estonian airspace, as well as incidents over Denmark and Romania. This wave confirmed that Europe’s security is now indivisible from the drone threat.

The contemporary broad airborne threat matrix facing European defense planners has expanded well beyond low-slow-small UAS, encompassing a dangerous variety of complex modern airborne threats that collectively saturate defensive systems:

• Strike Drones and Loitering Munitions (LMs): This category includes mass-produced FPV drones and LMs (e.g., Russian Lancet variants), which directly attack forces and impose disproportionate costs on the defender, enabling adversaries to erode Western precision strike advantage through “precise mass.”
• Ballistic Missiles and Rockets: The threat includes sophisticated, long-range ballistic missiles and shorter-range rockets. The strategic danger is demonstrated by the Houthi campaign in the Red Sea, where U.S. naval forces faced heterogeneous salvos including anti-ship ballistic missiles. In response, the Navy was forced to fire high-end interceptors like the SM-2s, SM-6s, and ESSMs, consuming over a billion dollars in interceptors and leaving stockpiles “dangerously low.”
• Cruise Missiles and Gliding Munitions: This threat is defined by speed, range, and terrain-following profiles. Cruise missiles (like the US Tomahawk) and converted armaments, such as long-range gliding bombs (like Russian FAB-500T with Universal Planning and Correction Modules), extend strike ranges well beyond 100 km.
• The Hybrid Swarm Challenge: The overall complexity is amplified by the adversary’s ability to launch complex heterogeneous salvos pairing low-cost drones alongside cruise and ballistic missiles. This tactic exploits the limits of traditional air defense systems.

For European nations, the key takeaway is one of urgency. This is not a future-war concept; it is a present-day reality that renders unprotected assets, borders, and infrastructure indefensible.

However, in the face of such a complex and seemingly overwhelming threat, what actions should be undertaken? Some countries, confronted with this formidable challenge, find themselves immobilized and unable to make decisions, owing to the belief that a comprehensive solution necessitates highly expensive models akin to those of the United States and Israel. But is this assumption valid? This article aims to assess current threats and explore incremental measures to optimize protection per Euro spent from the outset.

 

2. European Vulnerabilities

The recent, repeated, and deliberate airspace violations by suspected Russian drones over NATO members — including Poland, Denmark, Romania, and Estonia — are a strategic shock. These incursions, described by Danish officials as “hybrid attacks,” have exposed profound vulnerabilities that are particularly acute for small and mid-size European nations.

• The Cost-per-Kill Imbalance: This is the central, unsustainable gap. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte and other officials have stated publicly that using million-dollar missiles to defeat drones worth a few thousand dollars is economically unviable.
• A “One-Size-Fits-All” Mindset: The threat is not monolithic, yet many defense planners are still searching for a single “silver bullet.” The C-UAS requirements for a mobile military force (on-the-move, low size, weight, and power) are fundamentally different from those for a fixed military base (layered, high-power) or a civilian airport (low-collateral, legally constrained). Europe currently lacks distinct, mature solutions for all of these protection areas.
• Foundational and C2 Deficiencies (The Core Gap): The core vulnerability is systemic fragmentation. Current C2 networks for counter-drone defenses are siloed, often relying on manual processes for target identification and engagement. This sequential, manual process is too slow and will fail against larger attacks or sophisticated swarms.
• Insufficient Training and Outdated Doctrine: Counter-drone defense cannot be siloed to dedicated air defense units; every unit must possess drone self-protection capability. The speed of the modern threat demands faster training and a culture of rapid learning and adaptation. Currently, there is a lack of widespread, standardized joint training and doctrine (TTPs) across European forces. NATO acknowledged that it is playing catch-up to tap Ukraine’s expertise. Without this expertise, even the best equipment, like the US Army’s prototypes, failed to perform as expected in a real battle environment due to a lack of realistic testing.
• Legal and Regulatory Paralysis: A critical vulnerability exists in the domestic sphere. Most European legal frameworks are not designed for this threat. In Germany, constitutional law rooted in its post-WWII history largely bars the military (Bundeswehr) from acting in domestic airspace, creating a “drone defense gap.” Similarly, reports from Belgium indicate that defense manufacturer Thales has detected drones over its “top-secret” munitions plants but is not legally permitted to jam or engage them.
• Insufficient Capacity: Even where effective systems exist, the challenge is scale. A U.S. Army official, commenting on Ukraine, noted that their core difficulty is not a lack of technology but a lack of capacity — not enough systems to cover a vast front. This reality dictates that nations must develop resilient defenses that incorporate passive protection to limit damage when interceptors are exhausted.

 

3. Global Counter-Drone Responses

While Europe grapples with these gaps, other global actors are implementing lessons that can inform a realistic European strategy.

• United States (The High-End Model): The U.S. is pursuing a capital-intensive, high-technology path. This is defined by massive contracts for advanced kinetic interceptors, such as the $5.04 billion, 10-year contract for Raytheon’s Coyote missile system and a $95.9 million award to AeroVironment for its new Freedom Eagle-1 interceptor. The Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) is also prototyping next-generation interceptors like the Anduril Roadrunner.
  • Lesson for Europe: While the specific platforms may be too costly to procure at scale, the U.S. model of creating a joint architecture (formerly JCO, now JIATF 401) to test, integrate, and field competing solutions is a critical doctrinal lesson.
• Israel (The Integrated, High-End, Combat-Proven Model): Israel operates the world’s most battle-tested, multi-layered C-UAS architecture, having faced thousands of drones, loitering munition and Ballistic missile attacks from Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. Its model is not a single product but an integrated “system of systems” that provides a layered shield. This includes modular air defense systems like Israel Aerospace Industries’ (IAI) Barak MX, which fuses advanced GaN AESA radars with multiple interceptors (ranging from 35km to 150km) and “soft kill” electronic attack options.
  • Lesson for Europe: The Israeli model proves the effectiveness of integrating diverse, overlapping sensors and effectors (lasers, missiles, nets, EW) into a single C2 architecture.
• Ukraine (The Agile Model): Ukraine has become the world’s foremost C-UAS innovator through battlefield necessity. It is industrialising low-cost, domestically produced solutions, from FPV “Sting” interceptor drones to co-production partnerships with NATO members (e.g., UK manufacturing 1,000 Ukrainian Octopus-100 interceptors; Netherlands funding joint drone production).
  • Lesson for Europe: Ukraine proves that an agile, distributed, and low-cost industrial base can effectively counter a numerically superior foe. Critically, Ukraine is now exporting this doctrine, formally training Danish forces in its C-UAS tactics. Ukraine can be an excellent source of doctrine, training, threat assessment, and new technologies, which would need modification to operate within NATO context.
• Asia (China, South Korea, Japan; Industrial-Scale R&D): Asian nations focus on mastering both offensive volume and next-generation domestic defense.
  • China is aggressively building a huge fleet of kamikaze drones, ordering one million for delivery by 2026, and plans a multilayered naval defense (“Digital Great Wall”) using AI, satellites, HPM, and hypersonic missiles.
  • South Korea is integrating AI-based layered drone defense onto new combat vehicles like the K-NIFV and collaborating on manufacturing key US-designed UAS systems (e.g., GA-ASI Gray Eagle STOL).
  • Japan is rapidly developing vehicle-mounted high-power laser systems specifically to shoot down small drones.
  • Lesson for Europe: Sovereign defense capability requires a deliberate, industrial-scale investment in both R&D and production capacity to maintain a competitive edge.

 

4. Strategic Options for Small and Mid-Size European Nations

For smaller European nations with limited budgets and manpower, the U.S. procurement model is unattainable. A strategy of “affordable mass” and smart integration, drawing lessons from Ukraine and India, is the most viable path forward. This begins with adopting a bifurcated procurement model to distinguish between long-lead, foundational elements, and rapid, disposable hardware. This bifurcation model separates long-lead, foundational systems from rapidly produced and employed systems. The threat evolves faster than traditional defense acquisition cycles; a nation’s procurement doctrine must evolve with it.

• The Foundational Track (Long-Lead Strategic Procurement): A small country must think “top-down” and first establish a national C-UAS architecture. This is the “full map” into which future “puzzle pieces” will fit. This track includes the high-cost, long-lead items that cannot be bought in a crisis: integrated C2 software, long-range detection sensors (radars), resilient datalinks, and robust training and doctrine pipelines. A nation should start here. Procuring interceptors without this C2 and sensor backbone is operationally futile, resulting in a collection of disconnected systems that cannot share targeting data or deconflict from friendly assets, thus lowering their effectivity.
• The Rapid Track (Fast Acquisition of Effectors): Once the foundational C2 architecture is in place, nations can pursue a flexible, “plug-and-play” approach for effectors. This track is designed for low-cost interceptors, VSHORAD systems, man-portable jammers, and modular EW kits. These are the assets that may become obsolete in 18-36 months and must be treated as consumable and rapidly replaceable. The C2 architecture must be permanent; the effectors must be adaptable.

 

Based on this model, the following actions are practical within a 12-24 month horizon:

1. Action 1: Prioritise the Foundational Layer (Detection & C2): The most immediate priority is to see the threat. This involves procuring and networking active and passive, long-range RF detection systems and multi-mission radars to create a unified National Air Situational picture. This must be fused into a common C2 platform, whether developed nationally (like India’s SAKSHAM) or adopted from an ally (like the UK’s SAPIENT standard).

 

2. Action 2: Deploy Layered, Area-Specific Defenses (The “Rapid Track”): A “one-size-fits-all” effector is a myth. Using the foundational C2/sensor grid, nations must rapidly procure and deploy distinct, cost-effective solutions tailored to the unique requirements of each protection area.
   • Military Mobile Forces (Maneuver Protection): The primary challenge here is protecting moving columns (armor, infantry) from FPVs and loitering munitions. Solutions must be vehicle-integrated, rugged, and capable of “on-the-move” operation. Examples include:
     • Vehicle-mounted EW jammers
     • Mobile kinetic systems with 30mm airburst cannons
     • Robotic platforms with integrated directed energy (these are not operational yet and will be practically available in 3-5 years).
   • Military Fixed Sites (Base & Logistics Defense): This area can accommodate larger, more complex systems. The goal is to create a robust, multi-layered “dome” over static, high-value asset. Examples include:
     • Low-cost guided rockets
     • High-Energy Laser (HEL) in the future
     • Dedicated kinetic interceptors.
   • Critical Infrastructure & Civilian Population (Homeland Security): This is the most complex legal and operational environment. Solutions must prioritize low collateral damage, operating in dense urban areas or near civilian air traffic. Examples include:
     • GPS-denied, autonomous net-capture interceptors for urban environments. These are crucial for scenarios like the recent drone incursions at airports in Copenhagen, Munich, and across Denmark.
     • This area also requires the most urgent legal and regulatory reform to deconflict military/police responses with civilian aviation authorities (FAA, EASA) and constitutional law (like in Germany).

 

3. Action 3: Foster Local Industrial Capacity Through Dual-Use Innovation: The long-term economic and security solution rests in bolstering the local industrial base to guarantee supply chain resilience and economies of scale.
   • Create Innovation Hubs for Dual-Use Technologies: Establish regional or national innovation hubs dedicated to dual-use technologies (military and civilian applications). These hubs should focus, among others, on developing platforms, such as small UAS and related components, that are both militarily viable and have large commercial potential to achieve economies of scale.
   • Targeted Grants and Loans: Use grants and loans to incentivize local companies — a broad base of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) — to develop solutions for pre-defined, mapped national capability gaps (e.g., low-SWaP EW, autonomous targeting algorithms, long-range COTS sensor networks). This mirrors government support to innovation ecosystems seen in Ukraine and the US DIU model.
   • Leverage Joint Funding and Agile Procurement: No small nation should fund this alone. The “Drone Wall” initiative provides the political and financial framework.
     • Form joint procurement bodies, like the Nordic agreement for UAS (Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark), to pool orders for C-UAS systems, increase buying power, and lower unit costs.
     • Actively leverage the European Defence Fund (EDF) and PESCO projects dedicated to C-UAS, and mandate interoperability through common standards.
     • Immediately partner with Ukraine. Send national units to joint C-UAS exercises (like “Wings of Defense” with Denmark) to import battle-proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) directly from the front line.
     • Establish a national “Urgent Operational Requirement” (UOR) pathway to bypass bureaucracy and field proven, COTS, or ally-developed systems in months, not years.

 

5. Outlook: Building Resilience in the Drone and Missile Era

The recent drone incursions over Europe were not an anomaly; they are the new normal. For small and mid-size nations, defending against unmanned systems is no longer a niche, specialist capability. It is a baseline, non-negotiable requirement for national security, as fundamental as equipping soldiers with rifles or securing maritime borders. The objective cannot be an impenetrable, static “wall.” Rather, the goal must be a resilient, adaptive, and economically sustainable layered defense network. This can only be achieved by accepting the bifurcation of procurement: investing patiently in the “top-down” foundational architecture (C2, sensors, training) while simultaneously creating agile, rapid pathways to acquire the consumable, “fast-track” effectors needed to win the attritional fight – though fostering locally focused innovation hubs an adopting globally advanced technologies and systems.

European sovereignty in the 21st century will depend both on the number of high-end fighter jets a nation possesses and on its ability to control the low altitude “air littoral” above its own critical infrastructure. Resilience will be achieved by combining existing low-cost assets, funding innovative and affordable interceptors through joint European initiatives, and — most critically — fostering innovation, and adopting the legal, doctrinal, and procurement agility to field these solutions faster than the threat evolves.

 

The report is based on information available at the time of writing. The Pleronix Intelligence team strives to ensure accuracy and reliability; however, data and assessments are subject to change over time.