No Longer Classified: Who is Building the Future of Defence
The future of defence is being shaped by people far from the battlefield — and often outside the defence industry altogether.
From Ukraine’s garage-made breakthroughs to Brussels’ quiet policy shifts, the old boundaries between civilian tech and military capability are dissolving. In this piece, we explore how non-traditional players are reshaping defence — and what it means for Europe’s future.
From Steel to Silicon: The New Face of Defence
Gone are the days when defence was just about tanks, jets, and heavy steel. Today’s security challenges are shaped as much by algorithms and autonomy as by armour. The most strategic assets on the battlefield might no longer be counted in tank battalions — but in lines of code, networks of sensors, and streams of real-time data. In this landscape, technological superiority — not sheer firepower — is becoming the decisive factor in modern warfare.
Yet the systems that deliver these capabilities are still often stuck in yesterday’s timelines. Europe’s Eurofighter Typhoon, for instance, took more than 20 years from concept to deployment1. The F-35 followed a similar path2. Even France’s more recent Scorpion land systems programme, considered fast by traditional standards, took nearly a decade to reach frontline units.
Procurement cycles that once spanned 5 to 10 years — or more — now feel dangerously slow. When threats emerge in months, and technology evolves in weeks, that lag isn’t just inefficient — it’s a liability.
That’s why the centre of gravity is shifting. In Ukraine, battlefield innovation is increasingly coming from the edges: drone hobbyists, university engineers, garage tinkerers. They’ve built and deployed tools in days that legacy contractors would have taken years to deliver. This isn’t just improvisation — it’s a new model of defence innovation: fast, decentralised, and driven by outsiders.
Outsiders at the Helm: Who’s Really Driving Innovation?
The face of defence innovation is changing — and it doesn’t wear a uniform or sit in a boardroom.
Today, some of the most effective defence technologies aren’t coming from legacy arms manufacturers. They’re emerging from startups, coders, university spinouts, and software-first companies that were never part of the traditional defence establishment. These actors move fast, test early, and don’t wait for a procurement tender to build something useful.
Take Skydio, a U.S. drone startup founded by former MIT engineers. It has grown into the largest U.S. drone manufacturer by volume, leveraging breakthrough AI to create autonomous drones trusted by government customers.
Or consider Helsing, a Berlin-based company using AI to fuse sensor data into real-time battlefield intelligence. Founded in 2021, it has already supported Ukrainian forces and secured significant investments, positioning itself as a leader in Europe’s defence tech sector.
Then there’s Ukraine’s own drone ecosystem, where hundreds of small companies and informal teams are building and deploying FPV drones, jamming-resistant communications, and battlefield applications4. For instance, Ukrainian firm 3DTech is producing fiber-optic drones resistant to electronic warfare, showcasing the country’s rapid innovation in response to battlefield needs.
What all these examples have in common is agility. They don’t wait for permission, and they don’t need billion-euro facilities. They iterate. They adapt. And they prove that innovation in defence can come from unexpected places — if we’re willing to look.
Europe Wakes Up (Carefully)
For decades, European research and innovation policy operated under a rigid boundary: publicly funded science was for civilian purposes — full stop. Unlike the United States, where defence and dual-use R&D have long been part of a cohesive innovation strategy, the EU drew a sharp line between civilian research, and anything linked to military applications.
That firewall is now beginning to crack — cautiously, but undeniably.
The most significant shifts are happening at the level of the European Innovation Council (EIC) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). In April 2025, the European Commission proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 that would allow the EIC to support startups working on dual-use and even defence-related technologies5. The EIB has also started reconsidering its approach to funding security-relevant projects6, reflecting a broader strategic awakening in Brussels.
These aren’t just administrative updates. They signal a new political logic: one that sees strategic autonomy, technological leadership, and security resilience as interconnected goals.
But the shift remains contested. The League of European Research Universities (LERU) has criticised the Commission’s proposal as rushed and non-transparent, arguing that it threatens to erode the civilian focus that has guided the EU’s Framework Programmes for over 40 years. In a sharply worded statement, LERU described the Commission’s approach as a fait accompli, warning that it could undermine trust between academia and EU institutions and distort the allocation of innovation funding if not carefully ring-fenced7.
This tension reveals what’s truly at stake: Europe isn’t just updating a policy — it’s redefining the terms of its innovation model. The line between civil and military is no longer clear-cut. And if Europe wants to remain a global tech player, its funding mechanisms must evolve — not at the expense of civilian science, but in recognition of the strategic landscape we now inhabit.
So yes, Europe is catching up — but it’s a delicate balancing act. What’s needed now is not just permission for dual-use innovation, but coherent governance and political clarity to ensure this shift strengthens, rather than fragments, the continent’s research and innovation base.
Innovation Without Walls
What Europe needs now isn’t just more tech — it’s smarter policy: the kind that understands innovation, security, and economic resilience are no longer separate domains, but parts of the same strategic equation. The dual-use paradigm doesn’t blur the lines — it redefines them.
That means opening up the innovation ecosystem to new players, new partnerships, and new thinking. It means designing funding frameworks that accelerate, rather than obstruct, the path from lab to battlefield — and back to civilian use. And it means recognising that strategic advantage today isn’t forged in isolation, but co-developed across sectors, disciplines, and borders.
If Europe wants to lead in the technologies that will define this century, it must let go of the 20th-century assumption that innovation and defence belong in different rooms. They don’t. And the sooner our policies reflect that reality, the stronger — and more sovereign — Europe will become.
References
(1) European Parliament (2013). European Common Security and Defence Policy: Cost of Non-Europe Report. PE 494.466.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL-JOIN_ET(2013)494466
(2) U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2024). F-35 Joint Strike Fighter:Program Continues to Encounter Production Issues and Modernization Delays. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106909
(3) Programme Scorpion. https://www.arquus-defense.com/fr/programme-scorpion
(4) Business Insider (2025). Inside a Ukrainian company making exploding unjammable drones built to beat Russia’s electronic warfare. Retrieved from: https://www.businessinsider.com/inside-ukrainian-operation-making-fiber-optic-unjammable-drones-against-russia-2025-3
(5) European Commission. (2025, April 22). European Commission proposes Regulation to incentivise defence-related investments in the EU budget (Press release). Retrieved from: https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/european-commission-proposes-regulation-incentivise-defence-related-investments-eu-budget-2025-04-22_en
(6) European Investment Bank (2025, March 21). EIB steps up financing for European security and defence and critical raw materials (Press release). Retrieved from: https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2025-156-eib-steps-up-financing-for-european-security-and-defence-and-critical-raw-materials
(7) League of European Research Universities (LERU). (2025, April 24). Dual-use and defence in Horizon Europe: this is not the way to go. Retrieved from: https://www.leru.org/news/dual-use-and-defence-in-horizon-europe-this-is-not-the-way-to-go
Katarína Cséfalvayová