Readiness 2030 – the EU’s plan to ReArm Europe

Our latest analysis dives into the European Commission’s “White Paper for European Defence” and the ambitious ”ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030.” From unprecedented funding initiatives to strategic autonomy, the document reveals a shift in the EU’s approach to security — but is it enough to face the challenges of tomorrow?

Read this quick analysis of the ReArm Europe initiative written by our colleague Jakub Gazda.

 

Summary

On March 19, 2025, the European Commission unveiled the “White Paper for European Defence and the ReArm Europe Plan / Readiness 2030.” The twenty-one-page document sets out the Commission’s strategy to increase the Union’s defence and security autonomy in the face of a changing security climate. This short overview analyses the strategies proposed and subsequently discusses their possible effects.

 

Security concerns

From the opening lines, the White Paper is not a standard document as we have been used to from the Commission. It outright calls the Russian Federation a threat to Europe because of its aggressive war in Ukraine, the outcome of which is identified as critical in shaping the future of European security, with the concern being that a Russian victory will not only lead to the bolstering of future territorial ambitions towards both EU and non-EU states but that it will lead to the weakening of European cohesion and resolve in times of future crisis.

Apart from Russia, the Commission sets out further concerns, including the pivot of the United States away from Europe and, thus, the EU’s need to bolster its defensive abilities. However, more surprisingly, the Commission has also decided to name China as a concern. Although the language is far from that used with Russia, and the document stresses the strategic economic partnership between the EU and China, it is argued that a non-transparent military buildup, growing influence over the world economy and society, and coercion against Taiwan have made China a security concern of the EU.

Therefore, given the security concerns stated above, the Commission presented strategies for bolstering the Union’s defensive capacity by continuing and expanding support to Ukraine and gaining strategic autonomy in military equipment production.

 

Support to Ukraine

As per the war in Ukraine, unlike recent rhetoric by the White House, the Commission declares its commitment to continued and increased military support, such as the supply of 2 million artillery shells on an annual basis, air defence systems and missiles, as well as the continuation of training, equipping and regeneration of Ukrainian troops. Apart from continued support, the Commission presents new avenues for support to Ukraine following a potential ceasefire or peace, which include the support to Ukraine’s defence industry through technological transfers and procurement as well as increasing Europe’s military mobility, i.e. developing EU-wide infrastructure for the effective transportation of equipment throughout the continent.

The proposal of increasing Military Mobility within the Union is a point of interest for member states in Central and Eastern Europe including those directly neighbouring Ukraine (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania) as well as those located on transit routes such as Czechia and Bulgaria. With these states often suffering from infrastructure investment debt (i.e. the backlog in funding towards infrastructure maintenance and expansion) which in the case of Slovakia is allegedly up to 40 billion euros[1] increasing military mobility in the Union by developing dual-use infrastructure, such as railways, highways, bridges and/or ports, offers new potential avenues for member states to repair and establish much-needed infrastructure without straining their national budgets.

 

European defence

The primary goal declared by the Commission is the Unification of Europe’s defence. However, likely knowing the taboo nature of proposing a potential centralized European military, that debate is shut down early in the document, with the declaration that governments shall always retain complete control of their armed forces.

Instead, the EU focuses on expanding existing capabilities and developing an independent European defence industry.

It is the Commission’s vision for member states to rely solely on Europe’s defence and technological industrial base (EDTIB) for their future military procurements. And in this sentiment, the Commission sets out concrete policies to reach that goal. The most anticipated of which is the mobilization of 800 billion Euros in defence funding made available to member states, as well as the new Security Action for Europe (SAFE) scheme to allow governments to offset some of the costs when procuring military equipment with one or more states (including not only EU member states but also EFTA/ EEA countries and Ukraine). Finally, the Commission has relaxed the Stability and Growth Pact conditions when increasing defence spending, allowing states to activate the “national escape clause” to dedicate more funding without the concern for rising debt levels.

Apart from those showcased above, the remaining sections of the white paper fall short of providing further concrete policies and instead fall into the trap of non-specific forms of defence industry development, such as facilitating increased cooperation between companies or supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). While necessary for developing Europe’s defence, these seem more rhetorical than action-based.

 

Takeaways

The document summarized above is undeniably a large step forward and a testament to the fact that the security situation in Europe has in the first months of 2025 changed so dramatically that bold steps are necessary to adjust the European security framework.

However, it is unclear whether what has been presented by the Commission to the European public and the world meets those criteria.

Although the funding schemes for increasing defence spending of member states are unique in the history of the European Union, at their core, they are the same modus operandi we are used to: throwing money at the problem and hoping it will work out.

Instead, it is surprising that the idea of centralizing European foreign policy is all but ignored, despite the white paper being a reaction to external threats by the Union. The reasons for the Commission to tread lightly on the topic of further centralization in the pursuit of a more robust defence mechanism likely originate in the region that might benefit the most from a stronger Europe, i.e., Central and Eastern Europe.

It is doubtful that Slovakia and Hungary, the two “bad boys” of the region, when it comes to their stance on the Ukraine war and Russia,  would support any document that would signal increased centralization of the EU, and when considering that even the White Paper had to be re-named from “ReArm” to “Readiness 2030” because of Italian and Spanish opposition to the connotations of rearming, it becomes more than evident that the Commission has taken the path of least resistance to present a strategy even if it is a weaker one.

 

Forecast

In the next two years, we will likely see countries utilize the financial policies set forward by the Commission when investing in military equipment, including joint procurements using SAFE and adjusting regional development funds for dual use (civilian/military), increasing militaries’ defensive capabilities.

Thus, it is likely that because of increased sales, European defence companies will experience growth in size and production capacity, making them more robust. However, if Europe is to become strategically autonomous, it must become on par technologically with its rivals (Russia, China) and ally (the US), requiring sizeable investment and regulatory freedom in EU-wide research facilities, which may pioneer future technologies.

 

[1] https://www.teraz.sk/ekonomika/vano-investicny-dlh-vo-verejnom-sekt/789046-clanok.html