Mesiac: november 2025

The new Atomico State of European Tech report has just been released, and it offers a picture of Europe that is far more complex and far more hopeful than the usual conversation suggests. Europe now employs around 4.6 million people in tech, a workforce that has been growing faster than the American one for several years. It also produces more STEM graduates than the United States, which gives the continent a depth of technical and engineering talent that many countries would envy. Close to a third of all new global founders now emerge from Europe, and deep tech has become one of the continent’s strongest areas of investment. These are not small achievements. They reflect a continent that has the intellectual and scientific capacity to define the next technological decade.

Yet Atomico also captures something that Europe still has difficulty acknowledging. The continent struggles to convert this strength into economic transformation. Many of Europe’s most promising companies grow to a point and then stall, often for reasons that have little to do with technology itself. Late-stage capital remains limited, scaling across borders is more complicated than it should be and public institutions are often slow to adopt or test new tools. Europe invests a modest fraction of its GDP into venture capital, far below what is needed to sustain global leaders. The result is a pattern that has become familiar. Europe generates extraordinary talent and impressive ideas, but these assets do not consistently become sources of industrial or economic power.

This gap is precisely where dual-use innovation becomes important. The term often evokes narrow discussions about defence or security, but in practice it describes how modern technologies genuinely function. Artificial intelligence improves factory floors and also supports crisis response. Robotics enable logistics networks and also support remote operations. Secure communications, advanced sensors and next generation materials strengthen entire industries while also contributing to national resilience. These technologies do not belong exclusively to any single sector, and their relevance grows when different communities are willing to adopt them.

Europe begins this moment in a stronger position than it might realise. Its universities are still among the world’s leaders in robotics, photonics, materials science and AI. The engineering and scientific talent is deep and diverse. Many founders across the continent already build with an international mindset and are comfortable working on complex technologies that require years of development. The challenge, as Atomico shows with clarity, lies not in imagination but in scale. Europe reaches the prototype stage with confidence, then faces an abrupt narrowing of opportunity. Funding becomes scarce, procurement processes slow down innovation and cross-border regulations interfere at precisely the moment when companies need speed.

The recent United Kingdom Parliamentary assessment of defence readiness reveals what this structural weakness looks like in practice. Although the report focuses on military preparedness, the deeper message concerns industrial capacity. Even a country with a long-standing defence industry struggles to produce the surge capabilities, advanced manufacturing and technological integration that modern security environments require. This problem is broader than defence. It reflects the difficulty of converting scientific excellence into industrial strength, a difficulty that Europe faces across multiple sectors.

Dual-use innovation offers one of the most realistic ways to bridge this gap. It links research communities, startups and industrial partners with markets that already exist. A company working on autonomy, secure data fusion or advanced sensing does not operate in isolation. Civilian sectors need these technologies for productivity and resilience, while public institutions need them for safety, efficiency and strategic preparedness. This duality shortens the path from idea to adoption. It gives companies a more predictable early market and creates a stronger incentive for investors to remain engaged. It also anchors innovation in Europe, because the relevant customers are here.

To make use of this opportunity, however, Europe needs a clearer strategy. The first element is capital. Deep-tech companies cannot grow without substantial and sustained investment, especially in the later stages. Europe’s financial system still does not provide this at the necessary scale. If institutional investors had a greater role in supporting strategic technologies, more European companies could grow into global leaders without relocating elsewhere.

Public procurement is the second area where change is essential. Governments and public agencies are some of Europe’s largest buyers, yet they rarely act early enough to shape markets or accelerate innovation. If public institutions worked more closely with developers of promising dual-use technologies, they could reduce risk for private investors and strengthen entire industrial ecosystems. Adoption, not just funding, is one of the most powerful forms of support a government can offer.

The third area is the ease of scaling across borders. A young company that wishes to expand within Europe still faces a surprisingly uneven regulatory landscape. Differences in certification, procurement rules and approval processes slow growth at the very moment when momentum is essential. A more coherent European environment would allow technologies to move more freely, build supply chains more efficiently and reach customers who may not otherwise engage with innovation.

None of these steps require Europe to become something it is not. It already holds the scientific, technical and industrial foundations needed for leadership. What Europe lacks is the connective tissue that lets ideas grow into outcomes. Dual-use innovation can provide that link. It connects talent to industry, creativity to demand and research to production. It gives Europe a strategy that is both pragmatic and forward-looking, capable of strengthening its economy as well as its security.

The Atomico report shows the potential. The UK assessment shows the stakes. Dual-use technologies show the path. Europe can choose whether it becomes a continent where talent and ideas find their full expression, or one where they continue to shine briefly before moving elsewhere. If Europe chooses well, it will gain not only greater resilience, but also an economic base worthy of its talent and ambition.

 

Katarína Cséfalvayová

Prvým spoločným výstupom novej spolupráce medzi Institute for Central Europe (ICE) a spoločnosťou Pleronix je analýza „Affordable Sovereignty: A Realistic Air-Defense and Counter-Drone Strategy for Europe’s Small and Mid-Size Nations.“
Publikácia sa zameriava na realistické možnosti európskych krajín v oblasti protivzdušnej obrany a obrany proti dronom – a zároveň na hodnotenie hrozieb (threat assessment), ktoré sa v dnešnom rýchlo sa meniacom bezpečnostnom prostredí stáva kľúčovou súčasťou strategického rozhodovania.

Moderné konflikty ukazujú, že lacné a ľahko dostupné drony zásadne menia charakter vojenských hrozieb. Európske štáty preto potrebujú novú, realistickú stratégiu obrany, založenú na inováciách, spolupráci a efektívnom využívaní zdrojov. Drony, ešte donedávna technológia určená najmä na prieskum či priemyselné využitie, sa dnes stali zbraňovým systémom, ktorý zásadne ovplyvňuje priebeh moderných konfliktov.

 

        

 

 

Affordable Sovereignty: A Realistic Air-Defense and Counter-Drone Strategy for Europe’s Small and Mid-Size Nations

Joint Analytical Report

 

1. The Evolving Threat

The character of modern integrated national air defense has been irrevocably altered in recent years through technological revolutions in AI and hardware miniaturization. The proliferation of low-cost, precise, and autonomous Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and new aerial threats have fundamentally broken the economic model of traditional air defense. The war in Ukraine serves as a brutal, daily proof-of-concept: mass and price, not just technological sophistication, now define aerial lethality. Russia’s forces, for example, launched approximately 5,500 one-way attack (OWA) UAS against Ukraine in September 2025 alone. In response, Ukrainian forces reported hitting 66,500 enemy targets in the same month, with 39,200 of those hits attributed to kamikaze drones. Additionally, the issue of simplicity of operation, low costs and attribution challenges means that not only state actors, but also terrorist groups and small insurgent organizations now possess a strategic hostile capability which can disrupt national security.

In September and early October 2025, Europe faced a sudden and coordinated escalation: a wave of Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) incursions, widely attributed to Russia, targeted critical infrastructure across at least ten nations. These incidents exposed fundamental defense gaps and triggered an urgent political response centered on the pan-European “Drone Wall” initiative. The actions were a deliberate act of hybrid warfare designed to test NATO resolve, sow public discord, and probe vulnerabilities. Attacks included swarms of Gerbera (Shahed-style) drones entering Polish airspace, military reconnaissance drones flying over Munich Airport — forcing its closure and diverting dozens of flights — and suspected Russian fighter jets violating Estonian airspace, as well as incidents over Denmark and Romania. This wave confirmed that Europe’s security is now indivisible from the drone threat.

The contemporary broad airborne threat matrix facing European defense planners has expanded well beyond low-slow-small UAS, encompassing a dangerous variety of complex modern airborne threats that collectively saturate defensive systems:

• Strike Drones and Loitering Munitions (LMs): This category includes mass-produced FPV drones and LMs (e.g., Russian Lancet variants), which directly attack forces and impose disproportionate costs on the defender, enabling adversaries to erode Western precision strike advantage through “precise mass.”
• Ballistic Missiles and Rockets: The threat includes sophisticated, long-range ballistic missiles and shorter-range rockets. The strategic danger is demonstrated by the Houthi campaign in the Red Sea, where U.S. naval forces faced heterogeneous salvos including anti-ship ballistic missiles. In response, the Navy was forced to fire high-end interceptors like the SM-2s, SM-6s, and ESSMs, consuming over a billion dollars in interceptors and leaving stockpiles “dangerously low.”
• Cruise Missiles and Gliding Munitions: This threat is defined by speed, range, and terrain-following profiles. Cruise missiles (like the US Tomahawk) and converted armaments, such as long-range gliding bombs (like Russian FAB-500T with Universal Planning and Correction Modules), extend strike ranges well beyond 100 km.
• The Hybrid Swarm Challenge: The overall complexity is amplified by the adversary’s ability to launch complex heterogeneous salvos pairing low-cost drones alongside cruise and ballistic missiles. This tactic exploits the limits of traditional air defense systems.

For European nations, the key takeaway is one of urgency. This is not a future-war concept; it is a present-day reality that renders unprotected assets, borders, and infrastructure indefensible.

However, in the face of such a complex and seemingly overwhelming threat, what actions should be undertaken? Some countries, confronted with this formidable challenge, find themselves immobilized and unable to make decisions, owing to the belief that a comprehensive solution necessitates highly expensive models akin to those of the United States and Israel. But is this assumption valid? This article aims to assess current threats and explore incremental measures to optimize protection per Euro spent from the outset.

 

2. European Vulnerabilities

The recent, repeated, and deliberate airspace violations by suspected Russian drones over NATO members — including Poland, Denmark, Romania, and Estonia — are a strategic shock. These incursions, described by Danish officials as “hybrid attacks,” have exposed profound vulnerabilities that are particularly acute for small and mid-size European nations.

• The Cost-per-Kill Imbalance: This is the central, unsustainable gap. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte and other officials have stated publicly that using million-dollar missiles to defeat drones worth a few thousand dollars is economically unviable.
• A “One-Size-Fits-All” Mindset: The threat is not monolithic, yet many defense planners are still searching for a single “silver bullet.” The C-UAS requirements for a mobile military force (on-the-move, low size, weight, and power) are fundamentally different from those for a fixed military base (layered, high-power) or a civilian airport (low-collateral, legally constrained). Europe currently lacks distinct, mature solutions for all of these protection areas.
• Foundational and C2 Deficiencies (The Core Gap): The core vulnerability is systemic fragmentation. Current C2 networks for counter-drone defenses are siloed, often relying on manual processes for target identification and engagement. This sequential, manual process is too slow and will fail against larger attacks or sophisticated swarms.
• Insufficient Training and Outdated Doctrine: Counter-drone defense cannot be siloed to dedicated air defense units; every unit must possess drone self-protection capability. The speed of the modern threat demands faster training and a culture of rapid learning and adaptation. Currently, there is a lack of widespread, standardized joint training and doctrine (TTPs) across European forces. NATO acknowledged that it is playing catch-up to tap Ukraine’s expertise. Without this expertise, even the best equipment, like the US Army’s prototypes, failed to perform as expected in a real battle environment due to a lack of realistic testing.
• Legal and Regulatory Paralysis: A critical vulnerability exists in the domestic sphere. Most European legal frameworks are not designed for this threat. In Germany, constitutional law rooted in its post-WWII history largely bars the military (Bundeswehr) from acting in domestic airspace, creating a “drone defense gap.” Similarly, reports from Belgium indicate that defense manufacturer Thales has detected drones over its “top-secret” munitions plants but is not legally permitted to jam or engage them.
• Insufficient Capacity: Even where effective systems exist, the challenge is scale. A U.S. Army official, commenting on Ukraine, noted that their core difficulty is not a lack of technology but a lack of capacity — not enough systems to cover a vast front. This reality dictates that nations must develop resilient defenses that incorporate passive protection to limit damage when interceptors are exhausted.

 

3. Global Counter-Drone Responses

While Europe grapples with these gaps, other global actors are implementing lessons that can inform a realistic European strategy.

• United States (The High-End Model): The U.S. is pursuing a capital-intensive, high-technology path. This is defined by massive contracts for advanced kinetic interceptors, such as the $5.04 billion, 10-year contract for Raytheon’s Coyote missile system and a $95.9 million award to AeroVironment for its new Freedom Eagle-1 interceptor. The Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) is also prototyping next-generation interceptors like the Anduril Roadrunner.
  • Lesson for Europe: While the specific platforms may be too costly to procure at scale, the U.S. model of creating a joint architecture (formerly JCO, now JIATF 401) to test, integrate, and field competing solutions is a critical doctrinal lesson.
• Israel (The Integrated, High-End, Combat-Proven Model): Israel operates the world’s most battle-tested, multi-layered C-UAS architecture, having faced thousands of drones, loitering munition and Ballistic missile attacks from Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. Its model is not a single product but an integrated “system of systems” that provides a layered shield. This includes modular air defense systems like Israel Aerospace Industries’ (IAI) Barak MX, which fuses advanced GaN AESA radars with multiple interceptors (ranging from 35km to 150km) and “soft kill” electronic attack options.
  • Lesson for Europe: The Israeli model proves the effectiveness of integrating diverse, overlapping sensors and effectors (lasers, missiles, nets, EW) into a single C2 architecture.
• Ukraine (The Agile Model): Ukraine has become the world’s foremost C-UAS innovator through battlefield necessity. It is industrialising low-cost, domestically produced solutions, from FPV “Sting” interceptor drones to co-production partnerships with NATO members (e.g., UK manufacturing 1,000 Ukrainian Octopus-100 interceptors; Netherlands funding joint drone production).
  • Lesson for Europe: Ukraine proves that an agile, distributed, and low-cost industrial base can effectively counter a numerically superior foe. Critically, Ukraine is now exporting this doctrine, formally training Danish forces in its C-UAS tactics. Ukraine can be an excellent source of doctrine, training, threat assessment, and new technologies, which would need modification to operate within NATO context.
• Asia (China, South Korea, Japan; Industrial-Scale R&D): Asian nations focus on mastering both offensive volume and next-generation domestic defense.
  • China is aggressively building a huge fleet of kamikaze drones, ordering one million for delivery by 2026, and plans a multilayered naval defense (“Digital Great Wall”) using AI, satellites, HPM, and hypersonic missiles.
  • South Korea is integrating AI-based layered drone defense onto new combat vehicles like the K-NIFV and collaborating on manufacturing key US-designed UAS systems (e.g., GA-ASI Gray Eagle STOL).
  • Japan is rapidly developing vehicle-mounted high-power laser systems specifically to shoot down small drones.
  • Lesson for Europe: Sovereign defense capability requires a deliberate, industrial-scale investment in both R&D and production capacity to maintain a competitive edge.

 

4. Strategic Options for Small and Mid-Size European Nations

For smaller European nations with limited budgets and manpower, the U.S. procurement model is unattainable. A strategy of “affordable mass” and smart integration, drawing lessons from Ukraine and India, is the most viable path forward. This begins with adopting a bifurcated procurement model to distinguish between long-lead, foundational elements, and rapid, disposable hardware. This bifurcation model separates long-lead, foundational systems from rapidly produced and employed systems. The threat evolves faster than traditional defense acquisition cycles; a nation’s procurement doctrine must evolve with it.

• The Foundational Track (Long-Lead Strategic Procurement): A small country must think “top-down” and first establish a national C-UAS architecture. This is the “full map” into which future “puzzle pieces” will fit. This track includes the high-cost, long-lead items that cannot be bought in a crisis: integrated C2 software, long-range detection sensors (radars), resilient datalinks, and robust training and doctrine pipelines. A nation should start here. Procuring interceptors without this C2 and sensor backbone is operationally futile, resulting in a collection of disconnected systems that cannot share targeting data or deconflict from friendly assets, thus lowering their effectivity.
• The Rapid Track (Fast Acquisition of Effectors): Once the foundational C2 architecture is in place, nations can pursue a flexible, “plug-and-play” approach for effectors. This track is designed for low-cost interceptors, VSHORAD systems, man-portable jammers, and modular EW kits. These are the assets that may become obsolete in 18-36 months and must be treated as consumable and rapidly replaceable. The C2 architecture must be permanent; the effectors must be adaptable.

 

Based on this model, the following actions are practical within a 12-24 month horizon:

1. Action 1: Prioritise the Foundational Layer (Detection & C2): The most immediate priority is to see the threat. This involves procuring and networking active and passive, long-range RF detection systems and multi-mission radars to create a unified National Air Situational picture. This must be fused into a common C2 platform, whether developed nationally (like India’s SAKSHAM) or adopted from an ally (like the UK’s SAPIENT standard).

 

2. Action 2: Deploy Layered, Area-Specific Defenses (The “Rapid Track”): A “one-size-fits-all” effector is a myth. Using the foundational C2/sensor grid, nations must rapidly procure and deploy distinct, cost-effective solutions tailored to the unique requirements of each protection area.
   • Military Mobile Forces (Maneuver Protection): The primary challenge here is protecting moving columns (armor, infantry) from FPVs and loitering munitions. Solutions must be vehicle-integrated, rugged, and capable of “on-the-move” operation. Examples include:
     • Vehicle-mounted EW jammers
     • Mobile kinetic systems with 30mm airburst cannons
     • Robotic platforms with integrated directed energy (these are not operational yet and will be practically available in 3-5 years).
   • Military Fixed Sites (Base & Logistics Defense): This area can accommodate larger, more complex systems. The goal is to create a robust, multi-layered “dome” over static, high-value asset. Examples include:
     • Low-cost guided rockets
     • High-Energy Laser (HEL) in the future
     • Dedicated kinetic interceptors.
   • Critical Infrastructure & Civilian Population (Homeland Security): This is the most complex legal and operational environment. Solutions must prioritize low collateral damage, operating in dense urban areas or near civilian air traffic. Examples include:
     • GPS-denied, autonomous net-capture interceptors for urban environments. These are crucial for scenarios like the recent drone incursions at airports in Copenhagen, Munich, and across Denmark.
     • This area also requires the most urgent legal and regulatory reform to deconflict military/police responses with civilian aviation authorities (FAA, EASA) and constitutional law (like in Germany).

 

3. Action 3: Foster Local Industrial Capacity Through Dual-Use Innovation: The long-term economic and security solution rests in bolstering the local industrial base to guarantee supply chain resilience and economies of scale.
   • Create Innovation Hubs for Dual-Use Technologies: Establish regional or national innovation hubs dedicated to dual-use technologies (military and civilian applications). These hubs should focus, among others, on developing platforms, such as small UAS and related components, that are both militarily viable and have large commercial potential to achieve economies of scale.
   • Targeted Grants and Loans: Use grants and loans to incentivize local companies — a broad base of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) — to develop solutions for pre-defined, mapped national capability gaps (e.g., low-SWaP EW, autonomous targeting algorithms, long-range COTS sensor networks). This mirrors government support to innovation ecosystems seen in Ukraine and the US DIU model.
   • Leverage Joint Funding and Agile Procurement: No small nation should fund this alone. The “Drone Wall” initiative provides the political and financial framework.
     • Form joint procurement bodies, like the Nordic agreement for UAS (Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark), to pool orders for C-UAS systems, increase buying power, and lower unit costs.
     • Actively leverage the European Defence Fund (EDF) and PESCO projects dedicated to C-UAS, and mandate interoperability through common standards.
     • Immediately partner with Ukraine. Send national units to joint C-UAS exercises (like “Wings of Defense” with Denmark) to import battle-proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) directly from the front line.
     • Establish a national “Urgent Operational Requirement” (UOR) pathway to bypass bureaucracy and field proven, COTS, or ally-developed systems in months, not years.

 

5. Outlook: Building Resilience in the Drone and Missile Era

The recent drone incursions over Europe were not an anomaly; they are the new normal. For small and mid-size nations, defending against unmanned systems is no longer a niche, specialist capability. It is a baseline, non-negotiable requirement for national security, as fundamental as equipping soldiers with rifles or securing maritime borders. The objective cannot be an impenetrable, static “wall.” Rather, the goal must be a resilient, adaptive, and economically sustainable layered defense network. This can only be achieved by accepting the bifurcation of procurement: investing patiently in the “top-down” foundational architecture (C2, sensors, training) while simultaneously creating agile, rapid pathways to acquire the consumable, “fast-track” effectors needed to win the attritional fight – though fostering locally focused innovation hubs an adopting globally advanced technologies and systems.

European sovereignty in the 21st century will depend both on the number of high-end fighter jets a nation possesses and on its ability to control the low altitude “air littoral” above its own critical infrastructure. Resilience will be achieved by combining existing low-cost assets, funding innovative and affordable interceptors through joint European initiatives, and — most critically — fostering innovation, and adopting the legal, doctrinal, and procurement agility to field these solutions faster than the threat evolves.

 

The report is based on information available at the time of writing. The Pleronix Intelligence team strives to ensure accuracy and reliability; however, data and assessments are subject to change over time.