Mesiac: jún 2025

The future of defence is being shaped by people far from the battlefield — and often outside the defence industry altogether.

From Ukraine’s garage-made breakthroughs to Brussels’ quiet policy shifts, the old boundaries between civilian tech and military capability are dissolving. In this piece, we explore how non-traditional players are reshaping defence — and what it means for Europe’s future.

From Steel to Silicon: The New Face of Defence

Gone are the days when defence was just about tanks, jets, and heavy steel. Today’s security challenges are shaped as much by algorithms and autonomy as by armour. The most strategic assets on the battlefield might no longer be counted in tank battalions — but in lines of code, networks of sensors, and streams of real-time data. In this landscape, technological superiority — not sheer firepower — is becoming the decisive factor in modern warfare.

Yet the systems that deliver these capabilities are still often stuck in yesterday’s timelines. Europe’s Eurofighter Typhoon, for instance, took more than 20 years from concept to deployment¹. The F-35 followed a similar path². Even France’s more recent Scorpion land systems programme, considered fast by traditional standards, took nearly a decade to reach frontline units.

Procurement cycles that once spanned 5 to 10 years — or more — now feel dangerously slow. When threats emerge in months, and technology evolves in weeks, that lag isn’t just inefficient — it’s a liability.

That’s why the centre of gravity is shifting. In Ukraine, battlefield innovation is increasingly coming from the edges: drone hobbyists, university engineers, garage tinkerers. They’ve built and deployed tools in days that legacy contractors would have taken years to deliver. This isn’t just improvisation — it’s a new model of defence innovation: fast, decentralised, and driven by outsiders.

Outsiders at the Helm: Who’s Really Driving Innovation?

The face of defence innovation is changing — and it doesn’t wear a uniform or sit in a boardroom.

Today, some of the most effective defence technologies aren’t coming from legacy arms manufacturers. They’re emerging from startups, coders, university spinouts, and software-first companies that were never part of the traditional defence establishment. These actors move fast, test early, and don’t wait for a procurement tender to build something useful.

Take Skydio, a U.S. drone startup founded by former MIT engineers. It has grown into the largest U.S. drone manufacturer by volume, leveraging breakthrough AI to create autonomous drones trusted by government customers.

Or consider Helsing, a Berlin-based company using AI to fuse sensor data into real-time battlefield intelligence. Founded in 2021, it has already supported Ukrainian forces and secured significant investments, positioning itself as a leader in Europe’s defence tech sector.

Then there’s Ukraine’s own drone ecosystem, where hundreds of small companies and informal teams are building and deploying FPV drones, jamming-resistant communications, and battlefield applications⁴. For instance, Ukrainian firm 3DTech is producing fiber-optic drones resistant to electronic warfare, showcasing the country’s rapid innovation in response to battlefield needs.

What all these examples have in common is agility. They don’t wait for permission, and they don’t need billion-euro facilities. They iterate. They adapt. And they prove that innovation in defence can come from unexpected places — if we’re willing to look.

Europe Wakes Up (Carefully)

For decades, European research and innovation policy operated under a rigid boundary: publicly funded science was for civilian purposes — full stop. Unlike the United States, where defence and dual-use R&D have long been part of a cohesive innovation strategy, the EU drew a sharp line between civilian research, and anything linked to military applications.

That firewall is now beginning to crack — cautiously, but undeniably.

The most significant shifts are happening at the level of the European Innovation Council (EIC) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). In April 2025, the European Commission proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 that would allow the EIC to support startups working on dual-use and even defence-related technologies⁵. The EIB has also started reconsidering its approach to funding security-relevant projects⁶, reflecting a broader strategic awakening in Brussels.

These aren’t just administrative updates. They signal a new political logic: one that sees strategic autonomy, technological leadership, and security resilience as interconnected goals.

But the shift remains contested. The League of European Research Universities (LERU) has criticised the Commission’s proposal as rushed and non-transparent, arguing that it threatens to erode the civilian focus that has guided the EU’s Framework Programmes for over 40 years. In a sharply worded statement, LERU described the Commission’s approach as a fait accompli, warning that it could undermine trust between academia and EU institutions and distort the allocation of innovation funding if not carefully ring-fenced⁷.

This tension reveals what’s truly at stake: Europe isn’t just updating a policy — it’s redefining the terms of its innovation model. The line between civil and military is no longer clear-cut. And if Europe wants to remain a global tech player, its funding mechanisms must evolve — not at the expense of civilian science, but in recognition of the strategic landscape we now inhabit.

So yes, Europe is catching up — but it’s a delicate balancing act. What’s needed now is not just permission for dual-use innovation, but coherent governance and political clarity to ensure this shift strengthens, rather than fragments, the continent’s research and innovation base.

Innovation Without Walls

What Europe needs now isn’t just more tech — it’s smarter policy: the kind that understands innovation, security, and economic resilience are no longer separate domains, but parts of the same strategic equation. The dual-use paradigm doesn’t blur the lines — it redefines them.

That means opening up the innovation ecosystem to new players, new partnerships, and new thinking. It means designing funding frameworks that accelerate, rather than obstruct, the path from lab to battlefield — and back to civilian use. And it means recognising that strategic advantage today isn’t forged in isolation, but co-developed across sectors, disciplines, and borders.

If Europe wants to lead in the technologies that will define this century, it must let go of the 20th-century assumption that innovation and defence belong in different rooms. They don’t. And the sooner our policies reflect that reality, the stronger — and more sovereign — Europe will become.

 

References

(1) European Parliament (2013). European Common Security and Defence Policy: Cost of Non-Europe Report. PE 494.466.

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL-JOIN_ET(2013)494466

(2) U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2024). F-35 Joint Strike Fighter:Program Continues to Encounter Production Issues and  Modernization Delays. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106909

(3) Programme Scorpion. https://www.arquus-defense.com/fr/programme-scorpion

(4) Business Insider (2025). Inside a Ukrainian company making exploding unjammable drones built to beat Russia’s electronic warfare. Retrieved from:  https://www.businessinsider.com/inside-ukrainian-operation-making-fiber-optic-unjammable-drones-against-russia-2025-3

(5) European Commission. (2025, April 22). European Commission proposes Regulation to incentivise defence-related investments in the EU budget (Press release). Retrieved from:  https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/european-commission-proposes-regulation-incentivise-defence-related-investments-eu-budget-2025-04-22_en

(6) European Investment Bank (2025, March 21). EIB steps up financing for European security and defence and critical raw materials (Press release). Retrieved from: https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2025-156-eib-steps-up-financing-for-european-security-and-defence-and-critical-raw-materials

(7) League of European Research Universities (LERU). (2025, April 24). Dual-use and defence in Horizon Europe: this is not the way to go. Retrieved from: https://www.leru.org/news/dual-use-and-defence-in-horizon-europe-this-is-not-the-way-to-go

 

Katarína Cséfalvayová

From satellites to AI, today’s most transformative technologies don’t fit neatly into boxes marked “civilian” or “military.” In Europe, the rise of dual-use innovation is rewriting assumptions about funding, strategy, and security — and raising thorny questions about what counts as defence in an age of blurred lines.

 

What Exactly Is ‘Dual-Use’?

At its core, a dual-use technology is one that serves both civilian and military purposes. Historical examples include GPS (originally developed by the U.S. Department of Defence and now central to global transport and logistics) and the internet itself. Today, AI algorithms, biotech, and satellite systems all fall under the dual-use umbrella — simultaneously enabling commerce, governance, and defence.

Yet despite its intuitive appeal, the concept of “dual-use” has no universally accepted definition. While it’s commonly understood as referring to technologies that can be applied in both civilian and military contexts, its interpretation varies across policy domains, funding programmes, and legal systems. Some definitions focus on export controls; others include a broader spectrum of innovations that might be repurposed for defence and security. This lack of clarity poses real challenges for governance, especially within EU funding and innovation frameworks where clearer guidelines are needed. Some scholars have even suggested shifting toward terms like “omni-use” to capture the versatility and interconnectedness of modern technologies¹.

Three general categories of definitions tend to appear in academic and policy debates:

1. Teleological or value-laden definitions.

These emphasize the purposes a technology might serve — both beneficial and harmful. They focus less on the technical characteristics and more on potential outcomes. While often vague, this approach highlights the moral ambiguity and context dependence of modern innovations².

 

2. Functional or value-neutral definitions.

These describe dual-use technologies as those that can operate in both civilian and military settings. This definition focuses on technical applicability rather than intention or morality, and it’s commonly used in academic and policy documents^2,3.

 

3. Legal definitions.

Found in export control regimes, these are the most codified but also the narrowest. For example, EU Regulation 2021/821 defines dual-use items as “software and technology which can be used for both civil and military purposes,” including those linked to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons⁴.

Each of these definitions captures a different dimension of the dual-use concept — but none fully accounts for the blurred boundaries, governance dilemmas, and strategic challenges posed by today’s fast-moving innovation landscape.

 

Strategic Ambiguity: When Definitions Meet Policy

This definitional uncertainty isn’t just an academic issue — it plays out in real-world policy debates, especially where funding, accountability, and strategic priorities intersect. As governments expand their defence budgets, the temptation to reclassify civilian initiatives as “dual-use” — whether to meet alliance commitments or tap into favourable funding — has grown.

Infrastructure upgrades, digital networks, or even public health systems have at times been labelled “dual-use” with limited demonstrable military relevance. For example, certain rail and logistics projects within the EU’s Connecting Europe Facility have been categorized as dual-use due to their potential to support military mobility — even though their primary function remains civilian⁵.

This ambiguity is especially relevant ahead of NATO’s June 2025 summit in The Hague, where alliance leaders are expected to debate a proposed 5 % GDP defence spending goal: 3.5 % for direct military expenditures, and 1.5 % for broader security-related domains like infrastructure and cybersecurity⁶. While the intention is to reflect the multifaceted nature of modern security, the lack of clear criteria for what qualifies as “defence-related” spending could encourage creative accounting or politically motivated classifications. Without transparent benchmarks and shared definitions, there is a risk that this broader spending target may dilute, rather than strengthen, NATO’s strategic cohesion.

In this context, clearer guidance — on what is and what isn’t dual-use — becomes not just a semantic issue, but a strategic one. The credibility of funding tools, defence statistics, and even alliance solidarity depends on it.

The Central European Opportunity

At the Institute for Central Europe (ICE), we believe that understanding dual-use innovation is not just a technical matter — it’s a strategic imperative.

For smaller and mid-sized countries, the dual-use model offers a unique opportunity. While they may not lead in traditional defence-industrial production, many of them — including those in Central and Eastern Europe — possess dynamic tech sectors, highly skilled engineers, and nimble research institutions. These are ideal ingredients for contributing to Europe’s innovation landscape in ways that are both civilian-driven and strategically relevant.

Supporting dual-use innovation is not just smart national policy — it’s also becoming a European priority. As recent proposals by the European Commission and institutions like the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Innovation Council (EIC) show, the firewall between civilian and defence innovation is beginning to fall. On 22 April 2025, the Commission proposed rule changes that would allow the EIC to support dual-use companies and fund defence-adjacent technologies⁷ — a long-overdue shift that reflects global realities and responds to the urgent need for Europe to remain competitive in critical tech sectors.

This strategic reframing matters. Without access to defence-related markets, Europe’s most promising startups risk stagnation or relocation — a dynamic our competitors, especially the U.S., have long understood and capitalized on. As EIC Board Member Lars Frølund put it: “Dual-use innovation can turbocharge Europe’s competitiveness, create new markets, and strengthen our industrial base.”⁸

We at ICE are particularly interested in how innovation policy, funding mechanisms, and institutional partnerships can be shaped to support this evolving model. This means asking smart questions:

– How do we build innovation ecosystems that serve both security and societal goals?
– What rules and incentives are needed to foster responsible, scalable dual-use development?
– And how can smaller states meaningfully contribute to European security through innovation, not just procurement?

By tracking these trends — and participating in the broader conversation — ICE aims to support evidence-based policymaking that balances agility with accountability, and national interests with shared European goals.

 

References:

1. Singer, J.R., Mueller, E.F., Kraus, R. (2025). Dual-Use or Omni-Use? Rethinking Technology in a Borderless World. https://ssrn.com/abstract=5185227  or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5185227
2. Hähnel, M. (2024). Conceptualizing dual use: A multidimensional approach. Research Ethics, 21(2), 205-227. https://doi.org/10.1177/17470161241261466 (Original work published 2025)
3. Alic, J.A., Branscomb, L.M., Brooks, H., Carter, A.B., & Epstein, G.L. (1992). Beyond Spinoff: Military and Commercial Technologies in a Changing World. Harvard Business School Press.
4. European Union (2021). Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items. Official Journal of the EU.
5. European Commission (2024). Connecting Europe Facility – Infrastructure and Investment. https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-themes/infrastructure-and-investment/connecting-europe-facility_en
6. Reuters (2025). NATO’s Rutte says he assumes alliance will agree on 5% spending target. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/natos-rutte-says-he-assumes-alliance-will-agree-5-spending-target-2025-05-26/
7. Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (2025). European Commission proposes Regulation to incentivise defence-related investments in the EU budget. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/european-commission-proposes-regulation-incentivise-defence-related-investments-eu-budget-2025-04-22_en
8. Frølund, L. (2025). Viewpoint: Dual-use innovation, a strategic choice for Europe. Science|Business. https://sciencebusiness.net/european-innovation-council/viewpoint-dual-use-innovation-strategic-choice-europe

 

Katarína Cséfalvayová

Ukraine launched one of the most daring operations of the war — a drone strike deep inside Russia using modified civilian tech. In Cardboard, Cabins, and Code, Katarína Cséfalvayová explores what this bold move reveals about the future of defense innovation — and why it matters for Central and Eastern Europe.

 

On June 1, 2025, Ukraine carried out one of the most audacious operations of the war: a coordinated drone strike on four air bases deep inside Russian territory, reportedly damaging or destroying at least 41 aircraft — including rare A-50 early warning planes and Tu-95 strategic bombers — across a thousand-kilometre radius from Murmansk to Irkutsk. Code-named “Spider Web”, the operation offers a significant lesson in the long history of asymmetric warfare. It demonstrates that the strategic assets of a major power can be successfully targeted by an underdog using an innovative approach to well-known technologies — not high-end weaponry, but civilian quadcopters, wooden cabins, trucks, mobile networks, and lines of code.

Far from being an outlier, this operation signals a broader transformation in defense: the blurring of lines between military and civilian technologies, and the rise of dual-use innovation as a strategic game-changer.

From Hobby Drones to Strategic Assets

Ukraine’s use of commercial quadcopters, modified with explosives and hidden in cargo trucks disguised as civilian vehicles, represents a breakthrough in operational creativity. Some 150 drones and 300 bombs were reportedly smuggled into Russia, their launch mechanisms concealed inside prefabricated wooden cabins mounted on lorries. Once in position, the roofs of these cabins opened remotely, and the drones launched autonomously using Russian mobile networks to stream targeting footage back to Ukraine.

But this isn’t Ukraine’s first lesson in dual-use innovation. In 2022, during the battle for Kyiv, commercial DJI drones were deployed for live battlefield reconnaissance. In 2023, Ukrainian forces turned Starlink satellite internet terminals, initially supplied for civilian connectivity, into secure frontline communications nodes. And in 2024–25, reports emerged of AI-based software guiding first-person-view (FPV) drones to deliver explosives with pinpoint accuracy — sometimes even adjusting mid-flight based on real-time feedback.

Ukraine’s most dynamic military innovations are emerging not from state arsenals, but from garages, hackerspaces, and repurposed civilian tech. Since the full-scale invasion began, Ukraine’s defense innovation ecosystem has expanded dramatically — driven less by traditional contractors and more by civilian entrepreneurs, engineers, and coders working outside conventional structures. By 2025, over 500 private companies were actively developing drones for Ukraine’s armed forces, with a national goal of producing up to 5 million drones annually — a staggering leap made possible by decentralized, startup-led ingenuity. Much of this innovation relies on open-source platforms, consumer hardware, and iterative prototyping, led by people who, until recently, had no ties to the defense industry. What Ukraine has shown is that battlefield innovation can be frugal, fast, and fiercely effective — especially when it breaks free from legacy procurement logic.

Lessons for the Future of Defense Innovation

What’s emerging is not just a new set of tactics — it’s a new innovation culture. This culture is defined by:

• Speed and iteration: Ukraine can test, deploy, and adapt drone technologies in weeks. Traditional procurement cycles in NATO often take years.
• Distributed innovation: Solutions are emerging from a mix of public R&D, volunteers, tech startups, diaspora networks, and civilian engineers.
• Dual-use everything: Communications, software, logistics platforms, and imaging tools — originally civilian — now form the nervous system of military operations.

This “frugal, fast, and flexible” model could reshape the way NATO and EU countries approach defense capability development — particularly those that don’t have sprawling defense industries.

Why Slovakia and the CEE Should Pay Attention

For many countries across NATO’s eastern flank, the implications are strategic. The attack demonstrates that the strategic capabilities of a major actor can be successfully challenged through the use of innovative, dual-use technologies. While parts of the region possess established defense-industrial capabilities, these operate on a smaller scale compared to major players in Western Europe or North America. What the region consistently offers, however, is a strong foundation of engineering talent, agile SMEs, and increasingly tech-oriented academic institutions. This combination makes it well-positioned to develop and integrate dual-use technologies — from drones and AI to secure communications and resilient logistics systems.

Here’s what the Spider Web operation underscores:

• Resilience is local: If an adversary can strike hundreds of kilometres inland using disguised civilian tech, then airbase and critical infrastructure protection must become a CEE priority.
• Agility beats legacy: Innovation doesn’t always require vast budgets. CEE countries can achieve strategic impact by focusing on niche excellence — such as counter-drone systems, sensor networks, or field-ready autonomy.
• Tech transfer must be strategic: R&D funding and innovation support should be aligned with dual-use potential, ensuring civilian technologies can pivot to defense and security applications if needed.

This isn’t just about military preparedness — it’s about building innovation ecosystems that serve security, resilience, and industry competitiveness at once.

From the Shadows to the Surface: Strategic Convergence

What Ukraine has demonstrated is that defense innovation is no longer confined to secretive labs or multibillion-euro procurement offices. It now flows through cargo trucks, cloud platforms, and open-source codebases. It is strategic without being centralized, and lethal without being expensive.

For the EU and NATO’s eastern flank, this is an opportunity. With the right support for dual-use R&D, startup integration, and testbed development, the region can become a driver of practical, high-impact defense innovation — not just a consumer of other nations’ tech.

The June 1 strike should not only be remembered for its tactical brilliance, but as a wake-up call for what modern warfare — and modern innovation — really look like.

📚 References

[1] The Economist (2025, June 1). An astonishing raid deep inside Russia rewrites the rules of war.
https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/06/01/an-astonishing-raid-deep-inside-russia-rewrites-the-rules-of-war

[2] Kyiv Independent (2024, December 11). Ukraine’s AI-powered ‘mother drone’ sees first combat use, minister says.

https://kyivindependent.com/ukraines-ai-powered-mother-drone-sees-first-combat-use-minister-says/

[3] TS2 SPACE (2024, January 18). Drones in Ukraine 2022–2025: A comprehensive report.
https://ts2.tech/en/drones-in-ukraine-2022-2025-a-comprehensive-report/

[4] Financial Times (2025, May 20). Ukraine is winning the drone start-up war.
https://www.ft.com/content/2c7d3c96-f6a8-4afa-bd88-5ea2fa39f5c1

[5] Atlantic Council (2025, May 20). How to prevent Ukraine’s booming defense sector from fueling global insecurity.

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-to-prevent-ukraines-booming-defense-sector-from-fueling-global-insecurity/

[6] Financial Times (2025, May 27). The Ukrainian drone pioneer racing Russia’s military machine.
https://www.ft.com/content/37ba3336-8df1-4a4c-b1c6-bd29309f8185

[7] Kirichenko, D. (2025, April 25). Garage Land: Ukraine’s Defense Start-Ups. Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

https://cepa.org/article/garage-land-ukraines-defense-start-ups/

[8] Bondar, K. (2025, May 28). The Russia-Ukraine Drone War: Innovation on the Frontlines and Beyond. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-ukraine-drone-war-innovation-frontlines-and-beyond

 

Katarína Cséfalvayová

EU spúšťa nový mechanizmus zameraný na podporu  európskeho obranného priemyslu. Podpora spoločného obstarávania a nové finančné možnosti, môžu pomôcť v rozmachu aj zbrojárstva a inovatívnych riešení.

Ako nové možnosti využijú krajiny strednej Európy, ako sa zapojí Slovensko ? Môže byť zbrojárska výroba náhradou očakávaného poklesu automobilovej produkcie? To všetko ešte len uvidíme. Čo však vieme už teraz je skutočnosť, že reálne dlhodobé benefity pre štáty prinášajú najmä investície do technologických inovácií a to najmä v sektore tzv. dual use technológií. Tam by podľa nášho názoru malo smerovať úsilie vlád o efektívne využitie tak existujúcich podporných mechanizmov, ako aj nových možností, ktoré prináša EU SAFE. Čo je  EU SAFE, aké sú základné mechanizmy fungovania a ciele iniciatívy píše za ICE spísal Jakub Gazda.

Martin Fedor

 

The European Council adopts the SAFE mechanism

 

On May 27, 2025, a key section of the “Readiness 2030 Plan” came into effect. SAFE, or “Security Action for Europe,” has been heralded as a key component on the path to increasing European strategic autonomy. Allowing member states and close partners of the Union to offset the significant costs associated with procuring defence systems while boosting the production and innovation capacity of Europe’s native defence industry.

In the sections below, this article explains the technical aspects of the SAFE mechanism, its potential future benefits for European security, as well as the reaction and potential consequences it may cause by excluding Europe’s largest arms supplier, the United States.

 

SAFE and how it operates

Primary goals: As mentioned earlier, the SAFE mechanism is designed as an intrinsic part of the Commission’s Readiness 2030 white paper. Its chief aim is to boost European defence production capabilities while decreasing costs for end-user countries by utilising common procurement incentivised by 150 billion euros of financial support from the EU.

Who can participate: The Readiness 2030 plan identifies security challenges as a Europe-wide phenomenon, and the SAFE mechanism does as well. Therefore, it promotes pan-European cooperation in defence procurement by involving a wide array of states. These include member states, Ukraine, states part of the European Economic Area and the European Free Trade Association, acceding countries, candidate countries, potential candidates, and countries that have signed Security and Defence Partnerships with the EU (the latest being the United Kingdom).

With 43 states meeting the eligibility criteria.

What can SAFE be used on: On March 6 2025, the European Commission identified priority areas of Europe’s defence which need reinforcement, subsequently dividing them into two categories based on immediate necessity and conditions of eligibility, serving as the guidelines for what type of equipment states may pursue through SAFE, with the equipment eligible for the SAFE mechanism ranging from soldier equipment and infantry weapons to air and missile defence systems (the complete list can be accessed here).

Furthermore, apart from the equipment above, a key criterion for utilising the SAFE mechanism, and one which has caused the most pushback from the United States, is the origin criterion. This requires that, at a minimum, 65% of the value of the acquired weapon system must be made in an EU member state, Ukraine or an EEC/AFTA country to be eligible for SAFE funding.

Application: States procuring defence equipment are encouraged to do so in conjunction with one or more eligible states to secure financial assistance in the form of long-term loans from the European Commission and offset the financial strain such procurement would otherwise pose.

 

What can we expect from SAFE when it’s implemented?

The mechanism, which comes into force on May 29, 2025, is an ambitious roadmap to both boost European defence manufacturing and decrease the cost for the militaries of EU member states and their allies.

If all goes well, the European continent may experience a renaissance in its native defence production, which, while on a high technological level, has been hindered by the influence and scale of defence contractors from across the Atlantic which have successfully established themselves as the “go to”  suppliers of complex defence systems, leaving European companies to fill in pockets un-served by American contractors rather than being the primary suppliers.

Furthermore, as lessons from the past have taught us, it is the defence sector that has driven cutting-edge, irreplaceable innovations used by civilians daily, such as the Internet and GPS, as well as less obvious examples like nylon and the digital camera. Therefore, by making the use of the local defence industry an indivisible criterion, the European Commission has either intentionally or unintentionally facilitated a vehicle for unprecedented dual-use innovation, which has the potential to benefit Europe both strategically and improve the lives of its citizens.

Nonetheless, before being too optimistic about the renaissance of Europe’s arms industry, it is necessary to acknowledge the head start both competitors from across the Atlantic and rivals to the east have had. The military-industrial complex of the United States has, for the better part of three decades, been the dominant leader in the innovation and production of modern weapon systems, essentially supplementing the decline of European defence expenditure and innovation since the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, the People’s Republic of China has, in the last two decades, risen from an importer of defensive technologies into a producer of systems on par with those of the United States, while Russia has lost the ability to produce highly complex systems due to the sanction regime, has shown a commendable ability to adapt to its new reality and produce lethal battle-tested systems that can take on weapons systems operated by Ukraine.

Therefore, while Europe and its close partners should achieve strategic autonomy in defence production, it is necessary to acknowledge that it is going to be a protracted process during which it is critical that cooperation and knowledge transfer continue to take place with our closest ally for the European defence sector to remain up to date with the latest technology and eventually even overtake them.